Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" Summary- Part 3

Summary of 400-676 sections.

In these last sections, Wittgenstein tried to give his arguments as to why Moore’s argument is not enough to silence the sceptics’ incessant criticism regarding the possibility of knowledge. Wittgenstein has analysed the nature of Moore-type proposition “I know that P”, and come up with a list of possible scenarios in which those type of propositions makes sense, the nature of the relation between “I” (the person who is holding this particular belief) and the belief itself, whether in any case, Moore-type propositions provide an answer to sceptics.

Let us look at the relation between “I” and the “belief” in Moore’s proposition “I know these are my two hands.” Moore is not describing the proposition, whose information is available prerogative to only for him. All of Moore’s propositions are known to everybody else just like him. At section 462, Wittgenstein asks “Why doesn’t he (Moore) mention a fact that is known to him and not to every one of us?  So, in all of his (Moore’s) examples, we seem to know just like him. So, to says that in a proposition like “I know P,” the belief “P” belongs only to the speaker is misleading. To make his point clear, Wittgenstein gives two propositions, in which, in one of the propositions there is a mentioning of “subjective attitude,” and the other one is merely stating the observation per se. In section 587, he says “...Whether “I know that that’s a …” says anything different from “that is a ….”. In the first sentence, a person is mentioned, in the second, not. But, that doesn’t show that they have different meanings. At all events, one often replaces the first form by the second, and then often gives the later a special intonation.” So, one of the implications of the above objection is that “I know” has meaning only when it uttered by a person. That is why there could not, for instance, be an impersonal notice on a cage in a zoo reading ‘I know that this is a zebra.’ He says at section 588, “But given that, it is a matter of indifference whether what is uttered is ‘I know...” or “That is…”.

However, Wittgenstein says that in some special circumstances, Moore-type propositions have some use, i.e., they are meaningful in those contexts. Wittgenstein admits that in unusual circumstances the Moore-type propositions can have a use, but not one which is a help against the sceptic. So, it is useless for the trustworthy Moore to assure the sceptic that he knows he has two hands. Wittgenstein devices various situations for the use of Moore-type propositions; ‘I know that that is a tree’ has a meaning when someone is worried about losing her eyesight.  He says that he cannot find a situation for ‘I know that I am a human being,’ but thinks that even that might be given a sense (section 622). At section 622, he says “For each one of these sentences I can imagine circumstances that turn it into a move in one of our language-games, and by that, it loses everything that is philosophically astonishing.”

Wittgenstein says that Moore-type propositions don’t make sense at all outside appropriate situations. “I know that p” become senseless. These types of propositions, without appropriate surroundings, lacks all sense. He says at section 464 that “I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I say: “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.”...I feel as if these words like “Good morning” said to someone in the middle of a conversation. So, in the above instance, saying “good morning” or randomly confessing one’s harbored beliefs to the friend out of nowhere doesn’t make sense it, until and unless we explain the intention behind those remarks. Convincing. He adds that one is that the information that “I know that this is a hand” is worth imparting, that casts doubt on its truth. Another is that the lack of appropriate context means that the sense of the remark is undetermined: ‘I know that’s a tree’ has no focussed meaning like ‘I know that these are my two hands.’

A most frequent reason for rejecting Moore’s ‘I know’ – namely, that ‘I know that p’ makes sense only when ‘I do not know’, ‘I doubt’, ‘I will check up that. .’ also make sense (section 574). At section 483, he says “The correct use of the expression “I know.” Someone with bad sight asks me:” do you believe that the thing we can see there is a tree?” I reply “I know it is; I can see it clearly and am familiar with it.” So, the utterance “I know” makes perfect sense where I can be asked ‘How do you know?’, and can reply by specifying one of several ways of finding out or resorting to some experience.

He says at section 550 “If someone believes something, we needn’t always be able to answer the question ‘why he believes it’; but if he knows something, then the question “how does he know?” must be capable of being answered.” But, unlike other instances where we can have some sorts of grounds to justify our beliefs (I know propositions), Wittgenstein says that he cannot give any surer grounds for the proposition that I have two hands.

Not only he is unable to give ground for his belief, but also the possibility of doubt or resorting to some evidence doesn't make any sense at all in this proposition. That is why Wittgenstein says that Moore can’t know that he has two hands because there is no need for the justification for those kinds of the proposition, and the propositions which are in no need of justification are not knowable. Hence they are propositions with certainty.

Though Wittgenstein disregard Moore-type of propositions, he also says they have some particular uses in some language-games. He compares “I know that p” in some situations as making some utterance, and my conceptualizing those propositions as utterances, all he wants to say is that they are in no need of verification at all. At section 510, Wittgenstein says “Of course I know that that’s a towel” I am making an utterance. I have no thought of verification. For me, it is an immediate utterance. I don’t think of past or future (And of course it is the same for Moore, too). It is just like direct taking of something, as I take hold of my towel without having doubts.” And in the preceding section, he continues as “...yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing.”

By ‘utterance’ in his other works Wittgenstein appears to mean a pre-propositional expression of a mental state – e.g. ‘I’m in pain’ considered as a cry of pain, not a report (section 510). Again ‘I know that that’s a hand’ can mean: I can play language-games with ‘hand’ – make statements like ‘I have a pain in this hand’ or ‘This hand is weaker than the other’ – language-games in which there is no doubt as to the existence of the hand. But Wittgenstein says that he would prefer to reserve ‘I know’ for the cases in which it is used in the normal interchange of conversation, where there is a possibility of doubt and verification or giving grounds for one’s own beliefs.

At times, Wittgenstein seems to agree that Moore knows Moore-type propositions. For instance, at section 520, he says “Moore has every right to say he knows there’s a tree there in front of him. Naturally, he may be wrong”. But he goes on to say that, whether he is right or wrong in this is of no philosophical importance, and it cannot help Moore’s case against the sceptic.

Wittgenstein proves the futility of Moore’s proposition by giving an incisive argument. The argument runs like this.

If Moore is attacking those who say that one cannot really know such a thing (sceptics saying we can’t know anything in general), he can’t do it by assuring them that he knows this and that (Moore saying “I know that these are my two hands”.) it is because one need not believe him.

If “I know” is used in a context where it is senseless, then Moore has fallen into the same error as the sceptic who has tried to doubt where doubt is senseless. For the possibility of doubt and the possibility of knowledge go together.

Either way, it is a mistake to counter the sceptic’s assertion that one cannot know something by saying ‘I do know it.’

So at section 521, he finally says what went wrong in Moore’s argument. Wittgenstein says “Moore’s mistake lies in this- countering the assertion that one cannot know that, by saying “I do know it.”

Though Wittgenstein was unwilling, in general, to agree with Moore that there were certain propositions which he knew, he thought that Moore was right that there were certain empirical propositions which had a special status. He says that they are empirical in a special sense. He says they are not the result of the inquiry, but the foundation of research. At section 657, he says that they were fossilized empirical propositions which form channels for the ordinary, fluid propositions. This why he characterized these special empirical propositions as forming the base of the language-game itself. At section 401, he says “Propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts.” Later, he adds they are not, like ordinary empirical propositions, propositions about (parts of) the world: they are ones which make up our world-picture. A world-picture is not learned by experience.

Though these propositions give the foundations of the language-games, they do not provide grounds, or premises, for language-games. He says at section 559 “You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there-like our life.”

He explained how a child learns the language itself. At section 472 he says “When a child learns a language it learns at the same time what is it be investigated and what not.” And at 476 he says “Children do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exit.,-they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc.” So, the proper way of learning depends on the proper way of doubting and questioning. And one can know the proper way of doubting and question only when one realizes the foundations of language-games itself, these foundations are nothing but the propositions with certainty. So, if one doesn’t discover or realizes the propositions with certainty, then she or he won’t be able to learn the “knowing” process of itself. So, in a sense, knowledge itself depends on these foundational beliefs. Knowledge is impossible if one doesn’t know what to doubt and what not to doubt.

Descartes would have been unmoved by the suggestion that some propositions stood fast because they were the foundation of all thought. For the hypothesis of the evil genius was precisely a theological version of the supposition that human nature, with all its language-games of reasoning and testing, was radically defective and misleading. But then Wittgenstein does not think the sceptic can be answered, can only be silenced. In describing the foundations of language-games, Wittgenstein says at section 618 “...that the language-game must show, rather than say, the facts that made it possible. But that’s not how it is).” This echoes with Tractatus idea of “showing” rather than “saying.”

He conceived a close relationship between logic and language-games, and he says if one pays close attention to the function of language-games, then one can also understand how logic functions. At section 501, he asks “Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it.”

Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" Summary- Part 2

Summary of 200-400 sections.

Throughout this book, Wittgenstein is preoccupied with the conceptual clarity regarding concepts like doubting, knowledge, and certainty. He maintains that both the sceptics and the critics of sceptics in general, Moore in particular, have misconceived these notions altogether. His job in this book is to throw some light on these concepts so that he can give a fitting reply to most of the sceptics arguments against knowledge claims.

One of the claims that he is vociferously adhering is doubt presupposes the mastery of language game. What does he mean by this? Suppose someone were to say I doubt P, then in order to doubt P, one needs to have full knowledge about this P itself, meaning one needs to have a full understanding of the language game of P. For example when a sceptic says, “I doubt that my body exists”,  Wittgenstein says that to make such sorts of claims, the sceptic must understand what she means by “body” in the first place itself. Otherwise, she can’t doubt the very notion of the body itself. So, in section 306, Wittgenstein says, “If I don’t know if this is a hand.” But, do you know what the word “hand” means?

By extending this argument to little further, Wittgenstein seems to criticize Descartes notion of doubt or method of doubting itself. Descartes, in his meditations, seemed to doubt everything that he has inherited from his childhood. However, there are two things that he seems to not to question at all. They are- his own consciousness about his own mental states and processes and his knowledge of the language that he is using to express his scepticism. He seems to think that he is ‘certain’ about both these things, hence they are not in the purview of doubting itself. However, Wittgenstein questions the very same assumption in this book. Wittgenstein argues that if Descartes doubts everything, then he must also doubt the meaning of the words that he chooses to express his own scepticism. This gives a hint to one of the other prominent claim made by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein argued that universal doubt is not possible at all.

In section 310, he has devised a situation in which the act of doubting is itself doesn’t make sense at all, whereby he tried to show the “hollowness” of some doubts. He wants to imagine a situation in which, a student is constantly asking questions to the teacher, interrupting the lecture by asking all kinds of questions, like the existence of things, the meaning of the words, etc. Suppose the teacher responds by saying “So far your doubts don’t make sense at all”, Wittgenstein says that his impatience is justified because the student hasn’t learned how to ask questions, more importantly, he hasn’t learned the language game that he is being taught.

At 283 he also says that a child will not immediately doubt what it is taught. If she started doubting from the first stage of learning itself, then one could safely say that she is incapable of learning certain language games. First, the child was given a world picture, then only she starts doubting. In this connection, he makes a claim about the interdependence between doubting and non-doubting behaviour. At section 354 he says, “...there is the first (doubting) only if there is the second (non-doubting).”

Wittgenstein even says that not doubting something is part of some language games itself. This is expressed in 329 section, where he says “If he calls that in doubt-whatever “doubt” means here-he will never learn this game.” So, this means that not calling somethings to doubt is a precondition for learning the particular language itself. He also says that the questions we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt. He also says at 342, “That is to say, it (those propositions which are exempted from doubt) belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted.” Though there is a possibility of doubting every single proposition, we normally won’t do it. This is because we function or constituted in this way. He has expressed this thought in section 232, where he says “We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we couldn’t doubt them all...Our not doubting them all is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.” This notion sounds similar to his notion of “form of life”.

By extrapolating the above argument to the entire domain of language-games, we can say that the act of doubting is restricted to particular language games or domains of human life because that is how our form of life is constituted. But, what are these propositions which are not prone to doubt at all? One harmless answer- propositions with certainty, and Wittgenstein say this notion of certainty is akin to human beings and form of life. So, in section 358, he says “Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life.”

In connection with the above two claims, Wittgenstein also makes another interesting claim. He says doubt needs grounds. This means that you can’t merely say that you doubt something, instead, you also need to provide reasons for your doubting. Suppose someone says that there is a table, which can vanish or alter its shape and colour when no one is observing it, and then when someone looks at it again changes back to its old condition. But, he says, this idea of a table is not in "agreement with reality" (215). So, this means fanciful doubting is not a doubting at all and every legitimate doubt needs to have some grounds. This is expressed in section 323, where he says “So rational suspicion must have grounds. We might also say, The reasonable man believes this.” So, one interesting thing would be asking what he means by a “reasonable” man. Wittgenstein gives a working definition in the very next section itself. He says “Thus we should not call anybody reasonable who believed something in spite of scientific evidence.” But, at the same time he seems to cling onto a notion of rationality, which is not absolute at all, but something that is historically contingent in nature. The contingent nature of rationality is well expressed in section 336, where he says “But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found reasonable. And vice versa.” Interestingly, Foucault also seems to echo the same kind of notion in his Archaeological method of human sciences (Foucault, Order of things, 1970).

Though Wittgenstein doesn't name Descartes in this book, he seems to refer, and sometimes, responding to his arguments. Descartes, in the first and second meditations, has devised all kinds of fanciful doubt techniques to drive his point home. But, Wittgenstein argues that the act of doubting must lead to something, some sort of the change in practical life. He says while doubting, one should ask herself “Does this doubt leads to any difference in practice at all”? So, mere fanciful doubting like Descartes's, which does not have any repercussions on practical life, amounts to nothing for Wittgenstein. In fact, he will argue that they are not at all doubts, in the strict sense of the term. A mere speculative doubt or fanciful wish can’t be considered as a legitimate doubt at all. So, there are certain conditions regarding the very notion of doubt itself. In section 230 he says, “We are asking ourselves: what do we do with a statement “I know…”? For it is not a question of mental process or mental states. And that is how one must decide whether something is knowledge or not.”

Wittgenstein seems to believe that some of Moore’s claims about the empirical propositions are valid. Moore thought that not every empirical proposition have the same status as that of others. He says there are some empirical propositions which have a special status. And Wittgenstein has presented this special status as propositions which “stands fast” for him. He would argue that they are not the result of an inquiry, rather they form the base of our inquiry itself. In section 319, Wittgenstein says “...there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions. The lack of sharpness is that of the boundary between rule and empirical proposition.” So, this means that there is some sort of merging between these two kinds of propositions at the borderline. He says at section 401 that propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundations of all operating with thoughts.

Wittgenstein makes a distinction between a mistake and other forms of false beliefs. The difference between these could be that one can give a reason for the mistake, whereas one can only cite the cause for other forms of false belief. In section 217, he says “If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain that we could rely on none of them, perhaps we would say he was crazy. But can we say he is in error.” So, Wittgenstein calls other forms of false belief as some sort of mental disturbance. The reason why Wittgenstein makes this distinction is that he thinks there is a vast difference between taking someone out of mad belief and correcting a mistake. This difference is stated clearly in section 257 where he says “If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn’t know what it would mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I said something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why.” To put in a different way, the difference between two kinds of beliefs lies in our ability to “correct” false judgement in one kind of belief, which is pretty much not possible at all in the other kind of judgement.

I can make a mistake about the date of a historical event, yet by appealing to some reliable authority, I can correct myself. But, correcting someone who doesn’t believe that the earth existed long before she was born, or correcting someone who is making a mistake in calculating 11 times 11, is different from the above kind of correction. By making this distinction, Wittgenstein thinks that there is a difference between madness and a mistake. In the latter case, there is a false judgement, whereas in the former case, there is no judgement at all. By using this distinction, Wittgenstein criticizes Descartes “dream argument”. At section 383, Wittgenstein says “The argument “I may be dreaming” is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this remark is being dreamed as well- and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning.”

He also talked about how one comes to know or realise about these propositions of certainty in one’s life. This notion of Wittgenstein is known as “activism” or he is better known as an “activist” philosopher, opposed to both “pragmatic” and “foundationalist”. At section 232, he says “Our not doubting them all (propositions) is simply our manner of judging, and therefore of acting.” This notion of “acting” is in some sense similar to that of his “use” theory of meaning.

Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" Summary- Part 1

As a part of my course at the MA level, I chanced to read Wittgenstein's last scribbled philosophical remarks (published as a book titled "On Certainty"). As a part of the course assessment, I was asked to write a summary of the book in its entirety. I've divided the book into three parts, each containing at least 200 sections. In this first post, I'm going to post a summary of 1-200 sections, followed by remaining sections.

Summary of 1-200 sections.

Wittgenstein was motivated by the anti-skeptical and anti-idealist essays of Moore and tried to give a stronger counter-argument to skeptic’s position on knowledge claims. Moore was famously known for his ‘“commonsensical argument” that “Here is my hand and I can know it,” thereby he professes to refute the skeptic's position altogether. However, Wittgenstein seems to disagree with this line of argument in the first section itself.

If you do know the here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest. (section 1)

From it is seeming to me- or to everyone to be so, it doesn't follow that it is so. What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it. (section 2)

In the above sections, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that Moore doesn’t know that he has two hands in the strict sense of “knowing.” And at the same time, he is taking a jibe at Sceptics’ arguments that sometimes seeming so doesn’t necessarily latch onto what is the actual state of affairs; thus, there is a possibility of committing a mistake in claiming certainty about those claims. What Wittgenstein has in his mind when he says that “whether it can make sense to doubt it” is that he sees an inseparable relationship between “knowledge” and “doubting.”

Throughout the earlier sections, Wittgenstein makes a clear cut distinction between the concept of knowledge and certainty and in what way Moore was wrong in assuming that “he knows that he has two hands.” In addition to defining the above concepts, he seems to give a family of different conceptual notions which are loosely connected with either of the concepts as mentioned earlier. For example, when he was talking about the notion of “knowledge,” invariably he makes a point to refer to the notion of “doubt,” “making sense,” and “committing a mistake,” etc. In the same way, when he was talking about the concept of certainty, he always falls back on to the notions like “grammatical propositions,” “rules,” “unimaginability,” “inconceivability,” and “bedrock propositions,” etc.

He says that there is not much difference between “knowing” and “being certain” provided you know the subtle logical element that is always associated with the notion of certainty, i.e., when I’m certain, I can’t be mistaken. But, the notion of “doubting” is always associated with the notion of “knowledge.” We can think of or conceive of the negation of a knowledge claim at least at a theoretical level. Going by the logic of the two-valued system, if a particular knowledge claim is true, then we are very well can imagine or conceive of its negation without leading ourselves into a contradiction. Since most of these knowledge claim can be construed in what is called an “empirical” propositions, and it is logically consistent to think about their negations because they are merely contingent propositions altogether.

However, that is not the case with the propositions with certainty. According to Wittgenstein, propositions with certainty are not empirical and so the notion of truth and falsity doesn’t arise in their cases. Since these propositions are not coming in the purview of truth and falsity, their negation is also unthinkable, meaning we can’t imagine them being otherwise. To use his own words, propositions with certainty are simply as it is. So, if anyone were to doubt these propositions in the strict sense of “doubting,” that means either they didn’t understand the meaning of these propositions or they are not using “doubt” in a general or standard sense at all.

In section 12, he points out the common mistake that one would commit while characterizing the knowledge claims as such. Some people think that when someone said I know, it means that it is the case (a sense of necessity or oughtness), meaning it can’t be otherwise. He adds that “I know” seems to describe a “state of affairs which guarantees what is known,” guarantee it is a fact. He also argues that giving an assurance of “I know” doesn’t suffice to assert that there wouldn’t be any possible doubts that will creep into our judgments. Rather one needs to establish the notion of indubitability objectively. This notion of objectivity might be included giving a set of rules (be it grammatical or language-game rules, etc.) which will hold for every person who is taking part in the language game of certainty. Also, Wittgenstein seems to argue that the notion of “it is so” is nothing to do with knowledge. Instead, it is a ground on which the language game of certainty would take place.

At section 30, he gives a working definition of certainty. He says “ Certainty as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but one doesn’t infer from the tone of voice that one is justified.” So basically, it is similar to that of a following a rule in doing mathematics. In mathematical calculations, you do follow a rule while calculating something. However, you don’t infer anything from the rule itself. It is just a way of doing things so. So, being certain about some belief claims doesn’t necessarily lead to inferring some logical conclusions from those beliefs itself. In close connections with this functioning definition of certainty, he also talks about how he wants to erase some propositions that don’t get us any further. He says that in a philosophical language, he wants to expunge those propositions which come back to again and again as if bewitched. In a sense, these propositions with certainty are like the ground on which the language game of philosophy, in general, is being played upon.

Wittgenstein was assessing the soundness of Moore’s response to the skeptics. He asks “Is it an adequate answer to the skepticism of the idealist, or the assurance of the realist, to say that “They are physical objects” is nonsense?. He would argue that it is not all nonsensical to the idealists at all. However, we can object their claims by saying that in expressing the above propositions or its negation, what they are doing is nothing but stepping onto something that can’t be conceivable at all. They lie on the other side of the possibility and also those propositions are unimaginable in the first place itself. In addition to the above critique, Wittgenstein also levels another criticism against Moore response by saying that Moore was confused about the distinction between the knowledge and certainty itself. He says that what Moore is presenting as propositions that he “knows” are not knowable. It’s is difficult to believe as to why anyone should believe the contrary to those claims. In general,  it is possible to think/imagine the contrary/negation to all of the beliefs claims that we profess to “know.” Whereas in Moore’s examples, there is no way that we can conceive/think of their contrary/negation. This way of explaining the propositions indicates that there is a subtle difference between the nature of propositions that are “knowable” and the propositions that are “certain” in nature. This way of discerning the propositions into two different types is the reason why in the very first section itself, he says “If you (Moore) know that here is one hand, then we will grant you rest of them.”

In general, Wittgenstein argues that there is a possibility of committing a mistake about an empirical proposition. If that is the case, then it means that we might construe of a physical phenomenon in some manner and accordingly passed a judgment. But, at the same time, in future, there is a probability that there will arise a situation or a material condition in which we can think of the same empirical proposition in a completely different sense, meaning the truth-value of the same proposition might change in the future. But, he would argue that the notion of mistake freezes to be a mistake when you enter into the realm of the propositions with certainty. You simply don’t conceive of any negation in the case of this proposition. So, it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more improbable as we pass from the plane to the plane. At some point, this mistake ceases to be inconceivable.

In addition to defining empirical propositions and grammatical propositions in this manner, he also gives the broader definition of logic and a straightforward answer for truth. He defines logic as something that belongs to the description of the language-games. And h also says that “The truth of my statements (empirical) is the test of my understanding of these statements.” And at the same time, he also talked about how the truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of reference. So, when one inquiry about the truth and falsity of the propositions in general in philosophical analysis, then empirical propositions are coming under the purview of that inquiry. Whereas on the other side, propositions with certainty don’t. Because they are like presuppositions of the very inquiry itself and lies beneath the act of analysis itself, so, propositions with certainty lie apart from the route travelled by inquiry.

He goes one step further in section 94 and says that propositions with certainty are like inherited background (beliefs/propositions) against which I distinguish between true and false. As said earlier, the truth values don’t apply to these propositions at all. He even compares these propositions with the river-bed. He says that these logical propositions are like river-bed, meaning the sand in the river or the stream of the water might change depending upon the time. But, no matter what, the river-bed remains the same throughout the time. The sand and the stream of water are nothing but empirical propositions. As we know that the status of empirical propositions changes based upon the new evidence because they are contingent propositions.

But, one would wonder how do we acquire these logical propositions in the first place itself?

To which Wittgenstein gives an interesting answer. Interesting because one could read his response in different ways. He says that we are thought about these propositions from our childhood itself. And at the same time, when we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. So, we were bred with a web of beliefs from our childhood itself; we are given a world-picture itself. The child starts to act according to these beliefs and slowly came to realize that what are the empirical propositions and what are the propositions that are unshakably certain to her. So, he says in section 160 that the child learns by believing the adult, doubt comes after belief. We learn an enormous amount of beliefs and accept it on human authority, and then found out that some things are confirmed or disconfirmed by our very own experience. In a sense, believing is more fundamental than the doubting itself, which might be going against the Descartes’ idea of doubt as a primary tool to arrive at some indubitable beliefs.

And the second interesting question would be how do we know them? How does one realizes the nature of these propositions or what are the propositions with certainty?

In line with the above explanation of acquiring them, he also gives an answer which is consistent with the above one. In section 152, he says that I don’t explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility.

Some people associate Wittgenstein with a foundationalist(In terms of Epistemology) because of his notion of “river-bed” propositions and bedrock propositions. But, there are also people who will identify him as an anti-foundationalist. Precisely, he was recognized as an activist (one of the forms of anti-foundationalist). In section 110, he talks about how the test for any empirical propositions comes to an end and how do we characterizes this end itself. He says that the notion of testing comes to an end when we are dealing with logical propositions. The test will eventually come to an end because these propositions are nothing but what we as a human being are constituted off. We act in the way that we are acting because of those propositions. Hence, he is also called an anti-foundationalist.

    

My Reading Experience(2019) #1- Perumal Murugan's Poonachi

One of my new year's resolutions is to read "more" and "carefully'. But, sadly, there is nothing much to read carefully in Perumal Murugan's novel Poonachi. The satire is not subtle at all. It is right on the face. Moreover, the narrative lacks a suggestive nature, so much so that I wondered whether this is the same person who has written the novel "One part women." One of the best things about "One Part Women" is that the text focuses "mainly" on the character's life, and the narrative is weaved in such a way that we feel the "absence" of the author in it. The social and political debate followed after the publication is solely due to the text's suggestive character.

But, the narrator in this novel is so ambitious that he forgets to keep an eye on what he is saying rather than what he is saying. This is so evident in the foreword itself, where Perumal expresses his apprehension regarding the controversies and how he has chosen the theme of this novel. After reading the forward, it becomes clear to me that Perumal Murugan wants to make a social/political statement and one of the best ways is to make this happen is by writing a satirical text.

Two things that differentiate satire from other genres are subtle narrative and suggestive character (When I read Orwell's Animal Farm, I didn't know that it was a satire on the failed project of socialism/communism. The text is so perfect that one would feel the story is a plausible situation that can possibly happen somewhere on the planet.) Unfortunately, both these elements are missing entirely in this text. The ear tagging episode of Poonachi is so evident that the writer has simply borrowed events/emotions from the newspaper clippings (Aadhar-related news).

At times, the narrator has throttled down characters so that they can reiterate what he wants to say. There is one episode where the old women talk about environmental destruction and how humans are killing animals in the name of development. I felt these words are not coming from the old-women character at all. These are simply the narrator's words, and he has merely stuffed them into the characters. This has resulted in making the text more uneven in nature. So, the text has become somewhat rough, i.e.,  it's not a smooth surface at all. And at two or three places, there is a reference to the "Asura" kingdom (I don't know whether it was there in the original or the result of the translation). Apart from those two places, the text didn't offer any details about this place. I don't know why he has used this place as the character's residence (Maybe I'm missing something here). In the end, this novel turns out to be a social/political essay. 

PS: I have decided to read his other two novels, Koolamadari (Seasons of the Palm) and Nizhal Mutram (Current Show), translated by V. Geetha. I heard he was at his best in these two novels.

తిరిగిరాని ఆ ప్రేమ కావాలని మళ్ళీ అడగకు నన్న

అనువాద కవిత.

ప్రియా, ఒకప్పటి మనదైన ప్రేమని  ఇవ్వమని మళ్ళీ అడగకు.

కేవలం నీ వల్ల అప్పుడు లోకమంతా బంగారం రంగు కాంతులతో తళుక్కుమనేది. అదే నిజమని నమ్మా కూడా.

నీ ప్రేమ తాలూకా గాయాలకోసం కాకుండా వేరే వాటికోసం ఎవరు  కుమిలిపోతారు చెప్పు?

అసలు ఇంకా ఈ లోకంలో బాధపడాల్సినవి ఏముంటాయి చెప్పు నువ్వు జ్ఞాపకంగా వదిలెళ్లిన బాధలు తప్ప?

ఈ ఆందోళనలు, అన్యాయ ఆక్రందనల గోల ఏంటి?

నీ మొముపై గునిసియాడే ఆ వెలుగే కదా వసంతకాల రాకకి గుర్తు.

అదేంటో కానీ, ఆకాశాన్ని ఎప్పుడు చూసినా నీ రెండు కళ్లలాగే తోచేది.

నా ఒడిలోకి నువ్వు జారిపడితే, ఆ తలరాత కూడా స్తబ్దుగా, అసహాయతతో చూస్తూ ఉండిపోదా చెప్పు.

నీ మీద ఉన్న ప్రేమవల్ల ఇవన్నీ ఆలోచించేవాడిని, ఇవి నిజమని నమ్మేవాడిని కూడా.

కానీ, ప్రేమే కాకుండా ఇంకా వేరే బాధలు, ఆనందాలు ఉన్నాయ్ ఈ లోకంలో.

ధనికులు ఒక మాయ ముసుగుని చరిత్ర మీద కప్పేసారు ఎప్పుడో.

చీకటి రహస్యాలన్నీ తీగల్లా చుట్టి అందమైన అలంకరణలాగా అల్లారు లోకం గోడలమీద.

ఎప్పుడైతే నేను వెలుగు ప్రసరించని ఇరుకు సందుల్లోకి, మార్కెట్ స్థలాల్లోకి వెళ్లానో, మింగుడుపడని, ఇప్పటివరకు బయటపడని నిజాలన్నీ నా ముందు వచ్చి వాలాయి.

ఆ గల్లీల్లో నేను సగంకాలిన మనుషులను, రక్తమోడుతున్న ప్రాణాలను చూసా.

వాళ్ళని అక్కడే పదే పదే అమ్మడం, కొనడం నే చూసా.

ఈ కఠోర వాస్తవాలు కూడా గుర్తించాల్సిన సమయం వచ్చింది.

అక్కడనుండి తిరిగొచ్చిన తర్వాత వాళ్ళకోసం “నేనేం చేయాలనే” అనే ఆలోచన తప్ప ఇంకో తలంపే రావట్లేదు నాకు.

ప్రేమ మిగిల్చే భాదలు, ఆనందాలు కన్నా ఇంకా వేరే చీకటి వాస్తవాలెన్నో ఉన్నాయ్ ఈ లోకంలో.

ప్రియా, తిరిగిరాని మన ఆ ప్రేమ కావాలని మళ్ళీ అడగకు నన్ను .

మూలం -ఫైజ్ అహ్మద్ ఫైజ్. లింక్ 

సమ్మోహనం సినిమాపై కొన్ని ఆలోచనలు- Some Thoughts On Sammohanam

This is not a movie review at all. These are just my incipient understanding/observation of the film as such.

There is a faintish kind of embarrassing smile on Sameera’s face when Vijay asks her to “go away” from his home and eventually from his life too in front of his mother. We see her uncontrollable affection towards Vijay in her eyes and there is also an “internal emotional turmoil” inside her which kind of reflected in her demeanour and yet she doesn’t want to pour her heart to Vijay to explain what was actually happened. She holds back her emotions so gracefully that one would feel Vijay’s mother words about “accepting rejection” are metamorphosed into the Sameera’s faint smile.

Perhaps, this fraction of seconds of the frame defines the soul of the Sammohanam. There is a complex emotion behind this tiny smile yet the way in which it played out is so harmonic that one would feel it is as natural as a kid “longing” for a star in the faraway sky. And this marks Indraganti not only as a good writer but also as someone who can present the complex emotions in a simpler manner. This is evident in his most of the films given the fact that his films only have linear narratives. One of the difficult jobs of any artist is to present her art as simple as possible. Perhaps, to “be simple” is too complex. And to present these multitudinous mysterious emotions of a person in such a minimalistic manner (in that faint smile) is the biggest achievement for Indraganti as an artist.

సమీరా మోముపై లీలగా తచ్చాడూతూ క్షణభంగురంలో మాయమయ్యే ఆ నవ్వులో, తన ఊసులు, ఆకాంక్షలు మరియు తన అంతరంగిక మనసుని ఎరిగిన విజయ్ కి తన ప్రేమను వ్యక్తపరచాలనే ఉబలాటం, అదే క్షణంలో తన అంతః సంఘర్షణల వెగటు గాడ్పుల తీవ్రతని తన దరికి  చేర్చాలా వద్దా అనే ఊగిసలాట, ఇక ముందు విజయ్ తన జీవితంలో ఉండబోడేమోననే అనే తలంపు తెచ్చిన తానూ మునుపెన్నడూ భరించలేని బాధను లో లోపల దాచాలనే ఆత్రం ఉంది. వీటినన్నింటిని మించి విజయ్ వెళ్లిపొమ్మన్న మాటకు, లోపలనుండి ఉబికివస్తున్న కన్నీళ్ల విరహ ప్రవాహం, ఎక్కడ తన ఆత్మ గౌరవాన్ని నవ్వుల పాలేయ్యాలా చేస్తుందో అని ఎంత సావధానంగా ఆ నవ్వులో తన అర్ధతని దాచుకున్నా తీరు ఎంత సమ్మోహనంగా ఉందో. ఇంతటి హావభావాలను ఒక నటిలో కనిపించేలా చేశాడు  అంటే అది ఆ దర్శకుడి ప్రతిభకి ఒక నిదర్శనం.

In addition, I was wondered by the way in which the director has used costume colour to represent the inner anxieties/attributes of a character. In the balcony scene, where a heartfelt conversation happens between Vijay and Sameera, Vijay was seen wearing a white kurta-pyjama, reflecting his serene and idealistic attitude, whereas Sameera was seen wearing a black dress printed with a lot of colourful flowers, reflecting her complex yet mature understanding. When she says “no” to him, then he was seen wearing more of dark colours in the rest of scenes like dark red (represents turbulence in his mind), black (represents as if his life is gazing at a meaningless abyss) and towards the pre-climax where he went to see Sameera in the hospital, he was wearing a darkish blue shirt (a sense of reconciliation with the reality, a sense of acceptance). In the climax, there is this blue suit, which kind of explain that he found the love of his life and joy.

Interestingly, Sameera character has always had colourful dresses which kind of makes her a mysterious person yet a complex human being. Sameera’s ethereal beautiful face was shown in such a way that I felt her vulnerability and belongingness for a beloved one was thrusting forth from her face.

In general, our Telugu cinema has this habit of giving “messages” out of nowhere. This preaching business might earn some brownie points to the appreciation of the film. However, most of the times these messages sound as giving “public lectures”.

Now, look at how beautifully the scene was played out between Vijay and his mother about “accepting rejections” in life. It doesn’t come off as a lecturing audience, but it comes as a part of her character (she narrates how she was rejected by his senior in her college days) and it makes the audience to feel more for her character.

చివర్లో వచ్చిన ఆ నక్షత్రం metaphor కూడా కథలో ఎంతో ఆకర్షణీయంగా  అబ్బింది. నిష్కల్మషమైన ఆ లేత ప్రాయంలో ఎవరుంటారు చెప్పండి ఆ చుక్కలని ఇష్టపడని వారు. అంతే ఇదిగా, అంతే తీవ్రంగా, ఒకరిని ఒకరు ఇష్టపడటం అంటే ఒకరి ఇష్టాలను ఇంకొకరు గౌరవించడం. ఇది వదిలిపెట్టి ప్రేమంటే, ఒకరు ఇంకొకరికోసం తమ ఇష్టాలను, కోరికలను, తమ జీవితాలనే త్యాగాలు  చేయాలనే ఒక వెర్రి ప్రేమ కథ ఇది కాదు. ఇద్దరి భావాల మధ్యనున్న భేదాలను హుందాగా ఒప్పుకొని, ఒకరి పర్సనల్ space ని మరొకరు హరించకపోవడమే ప్రేమ అని ఈ కథ తెలుపుతుంది.

I liked the music very much and I felt like mouthing the lyrics for the very first time while watching a Telugu film. I liked the background music too and how it was edited in the final cut. There is a particular scene where Vijay’s friend talking about how he always wanted to create a gossip website. In this scene, the moment the visual is cut to the hero’s home, his friend's voice is also smoothly dissolved into the newer frame as if we are hearing the echo of his voice in Vijay’s home. It seems Vivek Sagar has made a special music theme for Naresh’s character, which was in perfect sync with his hilarious punch lines. But, I felt the same theme music has downplayed the Naresh’s emotion in some scenes especially in the scene where he realises how he was being cheated by the movie makers. What he says in that particular scene was coming from his experience and the dialogue and the emotion have something significant to say. However, instead of lending a sympathetic ear to the character, the audience were seen burst into laughter even in this scene because of the theme music.

I felt the tiff between Vijay and his sister is a bit staged and the emotions that are carried out in this scene seems somewhat forceful. In addition, the sister’s dialogue comes off not as a part of the character itself, unlike the mother’s one. డైరెక్టర్ తనకు చెప్పాలనుకున్న భావాలను ఇలా ఈ పాత్ర నోటితో అసంబద్ధంగా చెప్పించడానికే, ఈ సన్నివేశాన్ని stage చేశాడేమో అనిపించింది. ఆ చెల్లెలి చెప్పిన పెద్ద పెద్ద మాటలు తన జీవిత అనుభవంనుండి కాక వెనక నుండి ఎవరో గొంతునులిమి ఇబ్బందిగా చెప్పించినట్టుగా అనిపించాయి. The director could have done this scene in a nuanced way.

And interestingly the movie talks about what is “being a man” or what is manliness as such. The mother character says “ To be a man is to accept the rejections gracefully”. In the films like “Bharat Anu Nenu”, the same subject matter was discussed. Interestingly, in both the films, it was the mother's character, who defines this notion of manliness. While in “Bharat…”, the notion of manliness still hinges onto the patriarchal overtones, whereas in this movie, the director seems to infuse this notion if not with effeminate characteristics but with some humane emotions. However, just like the earlier film, this film also seems to believe that there is something called ‘manliness’, which is natural to human beings. Instead of deconstructing this very notion of socially constructed phenomena, Indraganti takes a route to affirm this existence cultural myth but with a slight modification. Perhaps, he might be thought that the Telugu culture is not open enough to receive this radical idea so that he is merely redefining/refashioning it to serve to the commoners.

ఆ మేడ మీద విజయ్ చెప్పిన సంభాషణలు  బాగున్నాయి. ముఖ్యంగా తన దృష్టిలొ ప్రేమ అంటే ఏమిటో చెప్పడానికి తన తాత జీవితం ఉదహరించడం వలన, తన కోరుకుంటున్న  ప్రేమ కేవలం ఊహాజనితం కాదు అని (There by saying he is not an idealist), తన తాత నానమ్మల ప్రేమ అలాంటిదే అని చెప్పి, తాను కూడా ఎదో ఒక రోజు  అలాంటి ప్రేమని పొందుతాడని చెప్తాడు (There by he marks himself as a realist).

ఇంతవరకు నాకు బాగానే నచ్చింది. కానీ, నాకు ఈ సన్నివేశం అంతరార్ధం నాకు ఏమనిపించింది అంటే, ఈ విజయ్ అనే మనిషి, చాలా సినిమాలో కనిపించే మనుషులకి మల్లే  ఒక “నిజమైన ప్రేమ” (True Love )అనే బ్రహ్మ పదార్థం ఒకటంటూ ఈ లోకంలో ఉందని, అది దొరికే వరకు చెట్లు, పుట్టలు వెతుక్కుంటూ ఉండాలని (ఇంకా నయం ఈ విజయ్ కూడా అలాంటి పనులు ఎక్కడ చేస్తాడేమోనని హడలి చచ్చానునుకోండి) నమ్మినట్టు కనిపించాడు నాకు.

This idea of “True Love” is one of the “tropes” that keeps repeating on the silver screen in form or in another. I feel this very conception of true love (One soul-mate) is a chimaera and this in a way has worked as an oppressive tool to restrict women body and their sexuality in the history. This one-to-one relation places more restrictions on women because this very conception was defined by men and it has patriarchal overtones associated with it.

However, these small things can be overlooked given things that this film has achieved.

And lastly a funny observation- In the trailer, Nandu says “ఈ టైపు అమ్మాయిలు అంత dependable  కాదు బాస్ (Hey boss, these heroines are not dependable at all)”. I thought this dialogue can accentuate the conflict between Vijay and Sameera. But, this scene didn’t make it to the final cut.

What Makes Kaala Stand Out From Other Films

In a recent Telugu film “Mahanati”, the protagonist “Gemini” laughs at a marching crowd of protesters. When the actor “Savitri” asks for the reason, he blurts out, “Telugu people are demanding for a separate Telugu state in Tamil.” A similar conundrum was faced by the early nationalists when they “voiced” their opinion in a language that is quite “foreign” to them. In both the cases, the “oppressed” have no other option than to express their dissent in the “oppressor’s” language. They know that this is the only way that the “other” can understand their pain and sufferings.

But, what if the very language that the oppressed are using to voice their opinion is itself built on the power relation? What if the language itself is the tool of the oppressor to propagate the oppression. This is evident in arguments of Feminists when they say how English has been a tool to disburse “patriarchal” cultural norms and how they were in a dilemma as to how to communicate this idea of inbuilt oppression in a language which propagates the very oppression that it is trying to dismantle.

Pa. Ranjith also faces the same dilemma.

Ranjith wants to voice his opinion about the oppression. But, he is only left with a medium that is propagating the very same oppression.

How can one respond to this dilemma? Can someone transcend this banality of perpetuation of oppression through language and still be able to express what she wants to express lucidly?

Ranjith “takes this dilemma by the horns” with a formidable path in the film “Kaala”,  which makes his narration so complex that one feels “lost” in the myriad of colours in the climax of the film. What makes this narration so complex that one gets a mixed feeling that makes one wonder whether this film is Rajini’s or Ranjith’s or a film that is stuck in between?

Just as in most of the films where the upper caste/class culture is preferred over a lower caste/class culture, the word “he” has been prefered over ‘she” in the English language throughout the centuries. Whenever there is a general noun, the authors have always preferred to use “he” over “she”.  So, just as in the films, English became a tool in the hands of the oppressor.

When women questioned this disparity in language, different answers were given to them without much thought. Some told them that “he” or “she” doesn't matter in language. Some told them to replace the “he” with “he/she” so that both the terms will have equal footing.

However, some women have started preferring “she” over “he” to subvert the power equation. This is exactly what Pa. Ranjith did in his previous films. He preferred the lower caste/class culture over the high caste/class culture.

Now, imagine an author, who, not only prefers the pronoun  “she” over “he”, but also makes the text complex by using the pronoun “he” whenever there are negative attributes attached to a subject and uses “she” whenever there are positive attributes attached to the same subject. This makes the reader stumble in the process of meaning-making.

This is exactly what Ranjith has done in his film “Kaala”. He not only subverts the idea of Tamil-hero mythology but also questions how we understand a hero as such. He not only questions the way in which the lower caste/class people have been represented in films but also questions our very idea of what a film is. Thereby Ranjith also critiques our epistemological assumptions, biases and prejudices and also critiques the foundations upon which our aesthetic beliefs stand.

To tell you how Kaala Ranjith ‘differs’ from his earlier films, let me tell you an example. Take the discourse around ‘Vegetarianism’. If he had been the earlier Ranjith, he would have emphasized different food habits that are associated with different cultures and how a certain dominant castes/classes are imposing their food habits on others in the name of purity/chastity. He would have been using the same binary opposites, i.e., vegetarianism and non-vegetarianism, but he would have prefered the term non-vegetarianism to subvert the power dynamics. But, what this new Ranjith is doing is quite revolutionary. He is still subverting the power dynamics but is using a different set of binary opposites altogether. Instead of the older terms (which are constructed by the oppressor), he is now using “meat-eating people” and “non-meat-eating people”, which are defined by the oppressed. With this, the power equation completely changes. What has been ‘centre’ becomes the ‘marginal” and what has been ‘marginal’ becomes the centre.

This is the other way in which one can transcend the oppression that is inherent in the language itself. Ranjith uses the same language/ film-techniques but creates his own vocabulary/new narrative methods like the above example of meat-eating and non-meat-eating people.

And his new vocabulary makes the narrative so complex that this results in some people asking, “Whose film is this anyway?”

This new way of filmmaking is unsettling for viewers who have been habituated to a certain form of film-making styles and film-watching experiences.

When we expect Rajini to fight after the echoes of “Kya Rey, Setting aa?”, someone fights the villain. When we expect a heart-wrenching cry from Rajini when his wife and son die, we hear his daughter-in-law’s voice.

Scenes like these make us bewildered as the film doesn’t give us what we expect or desire. But, to use Zizek’s words, “A film doesn’t give you what you desire. It tells you what to desire.” This new Pa. Ranjith is telling us what to desire in his films. He doesn’t want to make a gangster film like “Naayagan”, where the protagonist’s personal loss (just as in Kaala, the protagonist in this film loses his wife and son in a gang war) becomes a loss for the entire people associated with him. But, Ranjith’s protagonist's personal loss is immersed in the goal of uplifting his caste/class people's lives who have been oppressed since time immemorial. Unlike in a film like “Naayagan”, where the central character speaks for the entire marginal community, Ranjith makes people who are standing at the margins of this marginal community speak their mind. This is explicit when Kaala’s daughter-in-law tells what she thinks about her and her family's future after losing her husband. By making these people talk, Ranjith has ‘differed’ from his earlier narrative techniques. (Kabali is a fine example for his earlier technique where “Kabali” becomes the centre of the text.)

Ranjith’s new narrative technique in “Kaala” dismantles some of the older narrative techniques in the mainstream cinema.

One of the older technique that Ranjith dismantles is “completing an arch”. In the film, Huma Qureshi who plays Zareena is shown as a single mother. One would expect the director to say something about this point just to make this character a complete arch. But, Ranjith never talks about this point in the film, which makes this character “incomplete”. And one more character in the film which we feel is dealt with in the same way is that of Anjali Patil’s. She is shown as an activist but is missing in the end. By making these characters incomplete, Ranjith wants to emphasize that this sense of incompleteness is inherent in one's life.

And it is quite interesting how Ranjith breaks away from the usual hyper-emotional drama that surrounds “deaths” in commercial films.

In any commercial film, you can witness a heart-wrenching scene around the death of any character in the film. Be it Mani Ratnam or Shankar, both of them use “death” as a tool to create an emotional connection with the audience and they have successfully created such peaks of emotion in the audience with their film narratives.

However, in the process of creating this emotional bond, they portray “death” as if it creates a ‘break’ in reality. But the reality is something that changes continuously no matter what, and one feels that these kinds of filmmakers are making much ado about nothing when they portray death in this way. For some communities, death is a celebration: a way to unite with nature, and one can witness this kind of festive atmosphere associated with death ceremonials in low-caste communities in Southern India. In Kaala, Pa. Ranjith breaks away from this usual hyper-emotional drama about death and he portrays death in such a way that emphasises that death is also natural and is a part of human life. Ranjith was asking people to not mourn over their loved one’s death. Instead, he wants them to concentrate on the struggles and goals. This is evident when Rajinikanth says to the villain that he is not demoralised with the loss of his wife and son and he will fight till his last breath to achieve what he believes in.      

At times, Ranjith’s new techniques go against his older ones. Take for example how the break dancers were weaved in perfect sync with choreography in the song ‘Kagitha Kappal’ in the film Madras. This way of capturing the movements of people is possible only if we “freeze the reality”. You stop the time, capture the actions of people, and this makes a film devoid of “chaos”, which is a marker of reality that is changing constantly. But, in Kaala, you see the rappers suddenly entering into the frame. You feel some sort of incoherency and some “chaos”. This is what Ranjith wants to capture in Kaala. He wants to capture how this suddenness affects people's lives.

Ranjith’s narrative technique in Kaala is completely a different “Language-game”. To use Wittgenstein’s words “you will only understand the language being used if you are familiar with the language.”

In the same manner, to understand Kaala, one must acquaint oneself with the new vocabulary that Ranjith is creating in this film. If we understand Kaala’s son’s quarrelling with his father and his going away from home as a “vanavasam”, then what we are doing is nothing but understanding this new narrative with our old-film-appreciative knowledge. Hitherto our films have only had a single dimension when it comes to power, and to use the knowledge that we built upon watching/reading those films to judge “Kaala” is like applying the rules of Cricket to Hockey.

What about the subtexts in the film?

Everybody is talking about the fight sequence on the bridge. Some like it or some do not. But, did anyone pay attention to Rajinikanth’s car number in the fight scene?

Car number ends with 1931. In the year 1931, a historic confrontation took place between Ambedkar and Gandhi and this leads to the infamous “Poona pact”. In 1931, Ambedkar submits his representation to the “Simon Commision”, asking the British government to provide separate electorate for Dalits, which in effect asks that Dalits should be given the rights to elect their own members to the assembly. Ambedkar thought that this was the only way that the oppressed castes could shape their own future; that is, by electing their own people. Interestingly, this idea of shaping one's own future is stressed in the film, where Kaala tells to the angry Zareena, “We will build our homes (thereby our future) in the way we want/like.” And this bridge scene happens after the confrontation between Kaala and Zareena.

The other subtext is about land and ownership. People have related this ‘land ownership’ narrative only to the category class. But, who are these landless people in India?

Data from the 70th round of Land and Live Holding Survey of the NSSO indicates that 58.4% of rural Dalit households are landless: a much higher proportion than households in any other social group. And the Census-2011 data shows that 71% of Scheduled Caste farmers are agricultural labourers; they work for wages on land they do not own.

So what Pa. Ranjith is doing in his film is that of blurring the thin line between Caste and Class. Unlike other filmmakers who have dealt with land-ownership themes in their works, Ranjith wants to emphasize the point that caste is not just a social category; it is also entwined with class and has economic intonations too.

As someone pointed out, the way in which he depicted women characters in Kaala is highly appreciable. For this alone, we must support and give all the strength that we could give to him; he deserves this just for breaking away from the usual nonsense films.

And lastly, this might not be Ranjith’s best film, but, certainly, his way of filmmaking has matured when compared to his earlier films.